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Keane v. Carolina Freight Carriers
Corp.: RECOVERY UNDER
WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
ALLOWED WHERE CHILD
HAS NOT REACHED HIS
TWENTY-SECOND BIRTHDAY
In Keane v. Carolina Freight Carriers
Corp., 70 Md. App. 298, 520 A.2d 1142
( 1987), a case of first impression, the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland allowed recovery under Maryland's Wrongful Death
Statute to the parents of a child who had
passed his twenty-first (21st) birthday but
had not reached his twenty-second (22nd).
Gregory Keane, son of Michael E.
Keane and Catherine Patricia Keane, was
killed in an automobile accident caused by
the negligence of Carolina Freight Carriers
Corporation (Carolina). At the time ofhis
death Gregory was 21 years, 7 months,
and 28 days old.
The jury returned verdicts in favor of
the Keanes for mental anguish and emotional pain and suffering. Carolina made a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the
· verdict, based on the theory that Gregory
was too old to permit his parents recovery
under the Wrongful Death Statute. The
trial court granted the motion and the
Keanes appealed.
The Maryland Wrongful Death Statute
provides in pertinent part:
Damages zf unmarried child, who is not
minor, dies. -For the death of an unmarried child, who is not a minor child,
the damages awarded under subsection (c) are not limited or restricted by
the "pecuniary loss" or "pecuniary
benefit" rule but may include damages
for mental anguish, emotional pain and
suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, care, attention, advice, counsel, training or guidance where applicable if:
( 1) The child is 21 years old or younger;
or
(2) A parent contributed 50 percent or
more of the child's support.
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. Section
3-904(e) (1984).

The court of special appeals disagreed
with the trial court's interpretation of the
statutory construction of the Wrongful
Death Statute. "[T]he cardinal rule of construction of a statute is to effectuate the actual intention of the legislature." Keane, at
301, 520 A.2d at 1144, (quoting Schweitzer v. Brewer, 280 Md. 430, 438, 374 A.2d
34 7 ( 1977) ). In determining the legislative
intent the court looked to the language of
the statute itself. When the language of the
statute is plain and clear the court will give
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effect to the statute as it stands. In addition, "[r]esults that are unreasonable, illogical or inconsistent with common sense
should be avoided whenever possible consistent with the statutory language." /d. at
302, 520 A.2d at 1144, (quoting Schweitzer v. Brewer, 280 Md. 430, 438-39, 374
A.2d 347 (1977)).
The trial court based their interpretation
of the statute on a line of criminal cases
and held that since Gregory Keane had
passed his twenty-first (21st) birthday the
Keanes could not recover under the statute.
In so doing, the court erred in that criminal
cases apply a different set of rules of statutory construction than civil cases, those
being strict construction in favor of the defendant. In addition, there were numerous
civil cases on point which the court could
have looked to for authority.
The court of special appeals determined
that since the statute specifically stated it
covered a child who is not a minor, it was
"obvious that the legislature intended to
permit recovery for the death of certain
unmarried adult children." /d. at 302,
520 A.2d at 1144. Carolina argued that
recovery was limited to children under
twenty-one (21) since the legislature had
used the age of twenty-one (21) in granting
rights to individuals in the past, such as
the right to buy liquor. The court rejected
this argument because "the clear purpose
of the statute was to compensate the parents of certain unmarried non-minor children even though the children themselves
are given no legal rights." ld. at 304, 520
A.2d at 1145.
In looking at the language of the statute, the trial court thought that the phrase
"21 years old or younger" should be interpreted as a single entity. The court of special appeals concluded that the word "or"
was a "disjunctive conjunction [which]
serves to establish a relationship of contrast
or opposition," and does not alter or limit
the meaning of the phrase "21 years old."
/d. at 302, 520 A.2d at 1144, (quoting In
Re John R., 41 Md. App. 22, 25, 394 A.2d
818 (1978)).
The task then turned to defining what
was meant by the term "21 years old." The
court found that the term had a common
and ordinary meaning. That being; a person is thought of as being a certain age until
he reaches his next birthday. E.g., Covell v.
State, 143 Tenn. 571,227 S.W. 41 (1921);
People v. Cooper, 207 Misc. 845, 143
N.Y.S.2d 855, 857 (1955). Since Gregory
Keane had not reached his twenty-second
(22nd) birthday the court ruled he was still
twenty-one (21) years old under the plain
and clear meaning of the phrase when he
was killed.
The Court of Special Appeals of Mary-

land in interpreting Maryland's Wrongful
Death Statute looked to the legislative intent and the plain and clear meaning of the
statute. Keane makes it clear that parents
of a non-minor child who has passed his
twenty-first (21st) birthday but has not
reached his twenty-second (22nd) birthday
is considered to be twenty-one (21) years
old, and the parents may recover for emotional pain and suffering under the Wrongful Death Statute.
-Adam J. Seve/

Colorado v. Bertine: AUTOMOBILE
INVENTORY EXCEPTION TO
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
WARRANT RULE
In Colorado v. Bertine, 475 U.S. __,
107 S. Ct. 738 (1987), the United States
Supreme Court held that police officers
may open closed containers while conducting a routine inventory search of an
impounded vehicle.
A Boulder City police officer arrested
Steve Bertine for driving while under the
influence of alcohol. After Bertine was
taken into custody and before a tow truck
arrived to take the car to an impoundment
lot, another officer conducted an inventory
search of the van's contents. Directly behind the front seat, the officer found a
backpack. Inside the backpack the officer
discovered various containers holding controlled substances, cocaine paraphernalia
and a large amount of cash. After the inventory was conducted, the van was towed
to an impoundment lot and the contraband was taken to the station. At that time
Bertine was charged with unlawful possession of cocaine with the intent to dispense,
sell and distribute, unlawful possession of
methaqualone and driving while under the
influence.
Prior to his charges on the drug offenses,
Bertine moved to suppress the evidence
found during the inventory search on the
ground that the search of the closed backpack and containers exceeded the permissible scope of a search under the Fourth
Amendment. The state trial court determined that the search did not violate Hertine's right under the Fourth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution. However, the
court did grant Bertine's motion to suppress, holding that the inventory search
violated the United States Constitution.
On the State's interlocutory appeal, the
Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed but
premised its ruling on the United States
Constitution. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753 (1979), United States v. Chadwick, 433 u.s. 1 (1977).
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
Colorado court's decision holding that the

Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a
state from proving criminal charges with
evidence discovered during an inventory
search. In reaching its decision, the Court
found the facts of the case to be controlled
by principles governing inventory searches
of automobiles and of an arrestee's personal
effects as set forth in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)and 11/inoisv.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), rather than
searches of closed trunks and suitcases conducted solely for the purpose of investigating criminal conduct. Chadwick, Sanders.
Inventory searches are not subject to the
warrant requirement because they are conducted by the government as part of a community caretaking function, totally divorced
from the detection, investigation or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation
of a criminal statute. Cady v. Dombrowski~
413 U.S. 433 (1973). Moreover, neither
the policies behind the warrant requirement nor the concept of probable cause are
implicated in an inventory search because
they relate to the detection, investigation
and acquisition of evidence in a criminal
procedure. Since no claim was made in
Bertine that procedures instituted were a
subterfuge for a criminal investigation, the
Court's analysis centered upon the reasonableness of the routine caretaking functions.
In order to justify an intrusion on a constitutionally protected right, governmental
and societal interests must outweigh the
protected right. Automobile inventory
searches have been recognized as a means
of: ( 1) the protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody;
(2) the protection of the police against
claims or disputes over lost or stolen property and (3) the protection of police from
potential danger. 475 U.S. at __, 107
S.Ct. at 741.
In Bertine, Chief]ustice Rehnquist found
that strong governmental interests are
served by protecting an owner's property
while the property is in police custody and
insuring against lost or stolen property.
Further, the police who were acting in accordance with standard caretaking procedures did not act in bad faith. 475 U.S. at
__, 107 S.Ct. at 742. In his dissent,
Justice Marshall contended that the search
was unconstitutional because department
regulations gave police discretion to choose
between impounding the van or parking
and locking it in a public place. But according to the majority, the exercise of
discretion was exercised according to standardized criteria on the basis of something
other than suspicion of criminal conduct.
The dissent, as well as the Supreme Court
of Colorado, expressed the view that the
police, before investigating a container,
should weigh the strength of an individual's

privacy interest against the possibility that
the container might serve as a repository
for valuable items. In addition, the dissent
maintained that Bertine's expectation of
privacy in his backpack and its contents outweighed the governmental interests since
the intrusive search had gone into an intimate area of personal affairs. The Court
rejected these contentions, stating that a
single function standard is essential to
guide police officers who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and
balance the societal and individual interests evidenced in the specific circumstances
they confront. See New York v. Belton,
453 u.s. 454 (1981).
This case distinguishes constitutional
inventory searches from unconstitutional
ones. Bertine also indicates that inventory
searches will be valid so long as they are
conducted according to standardized procedures and on the basis of something other
than the suspicion of criminal activity.
Bertine follows a trend of other Supreme
Court decisions which hold that the legitimate governmental interests outweigh individual Fourth Amendment interests.
- William J. Morrison

California Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n. v. Guerra, Director,
Department of Fair Employment
and Housing: STATE MANDATED
BENEFITS FOR PREGNANT
EMPLOYEES HELD NOT
DISCRIMINATION UNDER
TITLE Vll
The United States Supreme Court has
upheld a California state statute which requires employers to provide female employees unpaid pregnancy leave of up to four
months. The employer's original action in
the United States District Court for the Central District of California challenged the
validity of the statute with respect to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. The court granted
the employer's motion for summary judgment, stating that the California statute was
pre-empted by Title VII and was therefore "inoperative under the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution."
33 EPD ,34,227, 34 FEP Cases 562 (1984).
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed, based on a finding
that the California statute was neither inconsistent with nor unlawful under Title
VII. Rather, the court found the statute
furthered the goal of equal employment
opportunity for women. California Federal
Savings & LoanAss'n. v. Guerra, 758 F.2d
390 (1985). The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, and in a 6-to-3 decision affirmed
the decision of the court of appeals.

Lillian Garland, a receptionist at a Los
Angeles based savings and loan, lost her
job after taking three months' pregnancy
leave. Garland filed a complaint with the
Department of Fair Employment and
Housing, which charged the bank with
violating § 12945(b)(2) of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV'T
CODE ANN.§ l2900et seq. Section 12945
(b)(2) requires an employer to grant an employee leave for a reasonable period oftime
on account of pregnancy. The Fair Employment and Housing Commission had
construed this section as providing pregnant workers a qualified right to be reinstated to the position they held prior to
their absence. Before the scheduled hearing took place, however, the bank, joined
by the California Chamber of Commerce
and a local trade union (both represented
numerous employers throughout the State
of California), filed this action in district
court seeking a declaration that§ 12945(b)
(2) is inconsistent with and preempted by
Title VII, and an injunction against its enforcement. Title VII prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of sex. The district court granted summary judgment for
petitioners, but the court of appeals reversed. Justice White delivered the opinion
of the Court.
In concurring with the decision on appeal, Justice Marshall first discussed
whether the California statute was preempted by Title VII. There are three ways
in which federal law may supersede state
law: in express terms; by inference where
there is no room for supplementary state
regulation; and when state law conflicts
with federal law. The Court dismissed the
first and second alternatives as inapplicable to the situation at hand, but concluded that the third basis for preemption
was at issue in the case herein. Sections
708 and 1104 are the two sections of the
1964 Civil Rights Act which the majority
analyzed with respect to preemption. Because both sections provide a liberal construction concerning state regulation of
employment discrimination, the Court
concluded that Congress recognized the
importance attached to state antidiscrimination laws and in no way intended to displace them. Therefore, it was held that §
12945(b)(2) is not pre-empted by Title VII.
The Court next discussed the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA"), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k), which amended Title
VII with respect to the definition of sex
discrimination. The Act specifies that sex
discrimination includes discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy. The petitioners
argued that the California statute provides
"special treatment" for pregnant employees,
and is therefore rejected by the language
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